Unsurprisingly, 2025 saw a further increase in litigation relating to electronic signatures. Not only have decisions become more numerous, they have also extended to a wider range of sectors, including B2B leasing, which had until now appeared largely unaffected. At the same time, judges were more inclined in 2025 to refuse recognition of electronic signatures, offering instructive guidance on how signature processes may be made more reliable and how evidential files can be strengthened.
For this overview of decisions delivered by the courts of appeal on electronic signatures in 2025, we have adopted an approach intended to highlight both the elements that are evolving and those that remain unchanged.
Key takeaways
- Litigation relating to electronic signatures remains stable in volume but has expanded significantly into B2B leasing, which is now frequently challenged.
- In 2025, courts of appeal more often rejected electronic signatures, adopting a more demanding approach than in 2024.
- A persistent confusion between qualified and non-qualified electronic signatures continues to weaken their judicial recognition.
- Rejections are primarily based on insufficient identification of the signatory, often limited to an email address or a telephone number.
- Judges require a readable, complete evidential file that is unambiguously linked to the signed contract.
- The quality and structure of the evidential record are becoming decisive, particularly in professional leasing, where case law has adopted a more stringent stance.
Slightly more decisions, more refusals, and an extension into B2B
In 2025, the courts of appeal handed down approximately 200 decisions concerning electronic signatures, a figure broadly comparable to 2024. As in the previous year, these decisions mainly concern consumer credit, but not exclusively. They now include bank account openings [1], mortgage loans [2] and, most notably, a significantly higher number of leasing contracts concluded between professionals [3].
The financial stakes of these disputes are broadly similar to those seen in 2024, typically ranging from a few thousand to several tens of thousands of euros. As a result, court-appointed experts are not engaged, which keeps the debate at a relatively non-technical level.
A less favourable reception of electronic signatures, but improved quality of judicial reasoning
In 2024, we observed that judges were generally receptive to electronic signatures. This remains the case, albeit in a more nuanced manner, as the proportion of refusals has doubled.
As in previous years, significant disparities persist between jurisdictions. A new and encouraging development in 2025 is the emergence, in certain courts, of well-reasoned and structured decisions [4], demonstrating a sound understanding of both the legal and technical dimensions of electronic signatures. Regrettably, however, confusion between qualified and non-qualified electronic signatures remains very common in many jurisdictions.
An increasingly concerning confusion between qualified and non-qualified electronic signatures
As in 2024, there remains a widespread misunderstanding of what constitutes a qualified electronic signature, on the part of both counsel and judges. Such qualification can only result from proof, first, of the use of a qualified electronic certificate and, second, of a qualified signature creation device. This in turn requires an ability to interpret the relevant conformity certificates, an expertise that appears largely absent. On the one hand, some legal advisers assert that a signature is qualified when it is plainly not; on the other, some judges identify a presumption of reliability (which, under Article 1367 of the French Civil Code, is reserved to qualified electronic signatures) where none exists. A number of striking examples can even be identified in this respect [5].
Although these may raise a smile, they nonetheless highlight a matter of genuine concern. As we already noted last year, this persistent confusion gives rise to the risk that “genuine” qualified electronic signatures, which benefit from a statutory presumption of reliability and are beginning to be used in the context of customer onboarding in the banking sector, may not be recognised as such. They may therefore face rejection, notwithstanding the high level of judicial reliability that the institutions implementing them legitimately expect.
Analysis of judicial refusals of electronic signatures
Situations in which courts refuse to give effect to an electronic signature essentially fall into three categories:
- deficient identification of the signatory,
- poor presentation of the evidential file
- and, more rarely, the absence of a proof file or the production of a proof file that is unintelligible.
Identity fraud
In certain cases, fraud as to the borrower’s identity is established. Thus, in a case decided in Nîmes (France) [6], the fraudster had impersonated a representative of a debt consolidation company and used the identity documents he had collected to take out an online loan for his own benefit with Carrefour Banque. Similarly, in another case decided in Lyon (France) [7], the lender (Younited) had been misled by falsified documents:
“Mr [I] demonstrates, by means of these documents, that it was not he who took out the disputed loan, that the documents provided to Younited were falsified, that the funds were paid into an account of which he has never been the holder and that the person who carried out the electronic signature fraudulently appropriated his identity… The fault allegedly committed by Younited is not established in the present case, as the falsifications made to the documents supporting the borrower’s situation could not be detected by a normally attentive reader.”
This latter decision incidentally highlights the advantage of an advanced electronic signature service compliant with ETSI standard 319-411-1, which requires the trust service provider to verify the authenticity of the identity document, typically by means of highly effective automated services. In practice, it is still common to rely on advanced signatures that are not compliant with that standard, on the grounds that requiring the signatory to upload an identity document is said to be counterproductive. That position is open to criticism.
No convincing demonstration of verification of the signatory’s identity
Courts are sometimes reluctant to recognise the evidential value of the sets of indicia produced by financial institutions. This was the case, for example, in a matter [8] where Sogéfinancement argued that, in order to subscribe to the loan, the borrower had to log into a personal online space to which only she held the access credentials:
“By emphasising that the electronic signature of the credit offer was conditional upon prior access to Ms [N]’s online customer space, the personal and confidential identifiers of which are known only to her, Sogéfinancement infers that only the respondent, whose identity document it also produces, could be the signatory to the credit in question. The reasoning put forward by the appellant might have been of assistance had it been accompanied by evidence substantiating the facts alleged. However, Sogéfinancement does not produce any evidence whatsoever that Ms [N] identified herself using Société Générale’s secure online banking system, nor even proof that the respondent is a customer of Société Générale.”
While the decision is strict, it serves as a reminder that an electronic signature file must not rely on a single indicium of the signatory’s identification, but on several, forming a documented and consistent body of evidence.
The use of commonly deployed signature authenticators, namely the signatory’s email address and/or mobile telephone number (to which a code is sent during the signing process), is not always received favourably. For example, in the case of the electronic signature of a professional leasing contract where the signatory was authenticated solely by an email address [9]:
“Thus, authentication based solely on the use of an email account does not make it possible to establish a unique link with the signatory or exclusive control by the signatory. The signature is not an advanced electronic signature.”
Again in the context of professional leasing, several courts of appeal have recently rejected electronic signatures on the ground that authentication via a simple email address and mobile phone number did not appear sufficient:
“On this point, it should be noted that, in both proof files, the author of the electronic signature is identified solely by reference to an electronic mailbox and a mobile phone number, which appears insufficient to authenticate the signatures on the contract and the delivery report [10].”
Or again:
“The proof file and the certificate of conformity created by Yousign, and produced by Loxit as exhibits nos. 22, 23 and 24, do not make it possible to clearly identify the signatory as being the company Cdm Services [11]. The verification email address ‘[Email 5]’ corresponds neither to the identification of the signatory to the contract, namely Ms [Y] [Z], nor to the company Cdm Services, and the telephone number to which the security code was sent by SMS is not linked to any identified user.”
Still in the context of professional leasing [12], it has also been held that reliance on a generic email address, without any other means of authentication, cannot constitute proof of identity:
“Furthermore, it is never specified, either in the lease agreement or in the evidence produced, that Mr [L] [Y] signed on behalf of the municipality of [Locality 2], the contracting party. Above all, it appears that the simple signature required authentication by means of a link sent to the municipality’s general email address, without validation of the signature by a code received by SMS or verification of the mayor’s identity document, Mr [L] [Y].”
Finally, in an instructive case decided by the Versailles Court of Appeal [13], the court noted that the bank failed to produce any evidence whatsoever identifying the signatory, in a situation where the signature had manifestly been carried out face to face but where nothing enabled verification of the checks allegedly performed:
“However, no verification of the signatory’s identity by the appellant is established, which cannot result from the mere statements appearing in the contract that Mr [O] acknowledged ‘having presented LCL with a valid identity document and proof of address dated less than three months’, since those documents were, moreover, not produced before the court.”
No linkage between the signature and the instrument
In a decision delivered in September by the Orléans Court of Appeal [14], the court noted that the timestamp appearing on the contract and on the proof file was identical. However, there was no other connection between the contract and the proof file: no reference to the contract number or even its title in the proof file, and no shared reference between the contract and the file. The court therefore concluded that:
“the court can only observe that Crédit Mutuel does not produce the elements that would make it possible to link the electronic signature relied upon to the two agreements which it claims were electronically signed by Ms [T] on 5 June 2021.”
Similarly, in a case brought before the Caen Court of Appeal [15] concerning a professional leasing contract, the absence of any reference to the contract in the proof file led the court to invalidate the signature:
“neither the number of the lease agreement 058-50522 nor its subject matter is reproduced in the certificates of completion or in the proof file.”
Unreadable proof file
Judges are sometimes irritated at being required to decipher unintelligible technical material, and understandably so:
“To justify the signature by Ms [R] of this agreement during the operation of the bank account, the bank produces a document referred to as a proof file which consists solely of a succession of codes that are unusable by the court, and no certificate of any kind. Nothing makes it possible to determine, on the basis of that document, who the trust service provider was” [16].
Such situations systematically lead to refusal of the electronic signature.
No production of evidence file
For several years now, production of the proof file has been a minimum requirement for judicial recognition of an electronic signature. Failure to produce it results in an almost automatic rejection [17], all the more so where no other evidence is submitted in support of the electronic signature:
“Thus, neither a proof file setting out the chronology of the transaction, nor any certificate of conformity issued to any company attesting that it provides trust services compliant with European Regulation 910/2014, nor any document evidencing the archiving of the transaction, nor any PSCE certificate has been produced before the court” [18].
What judges expect
For 2024, we noted a stabilisation of the range of evidence required by judges to convince them of the validity of the electronic signature process implemented had stabilised. The same observation applies in 2025.
The production of the proof file associated with the signed contract remains necessary. It must be readable and must contain the significant information relating to the transaction in clear text (names of the parties, instrument signed, timestamps, signature authenticators such as the mobile telephone number and email address). The file must imperatively include a reference in common with the signed contract (typically a number), as judges regard this as the “link” referred to in Article 1367, paragraph 2, of the French Civil Code defining electronic signature.
Certificates of conformity applicable to the signature process used, and in force at the time the instrument was signed, are also consistently expected.
Documents evidencing the signatory’s identity are likewise an important element (identity document, supporting documentation of various kinds). The production of a generic explanatory guide describing the signature process used continues to be viewed favourably by judges. Finally, care should be taken to refer to any extrinsic elements capable of corroborating that the instrument was in fact signed.
Analysis of the 2025 case law reveals the addition of a more recent line of debate concerning the wording “electronically signed” on the contract itself. This wording is now systematically expected where an electronic process has been used, and its presence, or absence, is noted in approximately one third of the decisions handed down [19]. That said, the mere inclusion of this wording in the signature block of the contract is not sufficient, in itself, to satisfy the court as to the reliability of the signature, nor does it dispense with the need to produce the remaining evidence. A significant number of decisions point out that “it cannot be inferred from the sole wording ‘Electronically signed on: 29/03/2019 – Mr [B] [O]’ that this document was in fact signed in that manner by him” [20].
Limited focus, for the time being, on probative archiving
In order for an electronically signed contract to retain its value over time, it must be deposited in a system of “probative archiving”. Most trust service providers offer this option, via connectors allowing documents to be archived immediately after signature by all parties. A number of decisions refer to the existence, among the documents produced, of an “attestation of conformity relating to the modalities for the preservation of electronic archives issued by CDC Arkhinéo” [21], but without drawing any conclusions from it. Conversely, the absence of such an attestation, or even of any reference to archiving, is not currently regarded as undermining the validity of the signature.
Outlook
In light of the decisions delivered in 2025, litigation concerning electronic signatures reveals several trends. Beyond the continuing misunderstanding surrounding qualified electronic signatures, there were more refusals in 2025, and proportionally many more in cases involving professional leasing, which should prompt caution among market participants. At the same time, a very strong level of expertise is emerging within certain courts, which in turn requires greater care in the preparation and presentation of evidential files, an area in which shortcomings are still frequently observed.
References
[1] Paris Court of Appeal, 10 April 2025, Case No. 24/00189
[2] 21 May 2025, Case No. 24/00700
[3] For example: Metz Court of Appeal, 29 July 2025, Case No. 23/02320
[4] In particular: Versailles Court of Appeal, 24 September 2025, Case No. 23/05058; Orléans Court of Appeal, 4 September 2025, Case No. 23/02217; Caen Court of Appeal, 5 August 2025, Case No. 22/02396; Riom Court of Appeal, 30 July 2025, Case No. 24/01381; Metz Court of Appeal, 29 July 2025, Case No. 23/02320; Bourges Court of Appeal, 27 June 2025, Case No. 24/00906; Colmar Court of Appeal, 10 June 2025, Case No. 24/02638; Versailles Court of Appeal, 27 May 2025, Case No. 24/04844; Versailles Court of Appeal, 27 May 2025, Case No. 24/04352; Caen Court of Appeal, 15 May 2025, Case No. 24/01282; Versailles Court of Appeal, 29 April 2025, Case No. 24/04372; Amiens Court of Appeal, 24 April 2025, Case No. 23/04010; Colmar Court of Appeal, 31 March 2025, Case No. 23/03270; Riom Court of Appeal, 12 February 2025, Case No. 24/00281
[5] For example: Lyon Court of Appeal, 11 September 2025, Case No. 21/05763: “the proof file relating to the first contract, created by Almerys, a proof management service provider, which recalls the transaction number xxx and indicates that Mr [D] [W], whose date of birth is stated, is identified by his mobile telephone number, which is specified, as well as his email address. Consequently, Locam benefits from the presumption of reliability of the electronic signature”; or Lyon Court of Appeal, 26 June 2025, Case No. 23/05477: “the above-mentioned proof files constituting qualified electronic signature certificates, Mr [V] is presumed to have signed the relevant preliminary loan offers, unless proved otherwise.”
[6] Nîmes Court of Appeal, 4 September 2025, Case No. 24/01605
[7] Lyon Court of Appeal, 4 September 2025, Case No. 23/06811
[8] Orléans Court of Appeal, 4 September 2025, Case No. 23/02217
[9] Rennes Court of Appeal, 3 June 2025, Case No. 24/02587
[10] Lyon Court of Appeal, 19 June 2025, Case No. 22/07107
[11] Toulouse Court of Appeal, 27 May 2025, Case No. 23/00301
[12] Caen Court of Appeal, 5 August 2025, Case No. 22/02396
[13] Versailles Court of Appeal, 30 September 2025, Case No. 24/06558
[14] Orléans Court of Appeal, 11 September 2025, Case No. 24/00744
[15] Caen Court of Appeal, 5 August 2025, Case No. 22/02396; see also Amiens Court of Appeal, 9 September 2025, Case No. 23/00031
[16] Paris Court of Appeal, 10 July 2025, Case No. 24/06433
[17] See for example: Paris Court of Appeal, 25 September 2025, Case No. 24/12895; Paris Court of Appeal, 15 May 2025, Case No. 24/02969
[18] Paris Court of Appeal, 10 July 2025, Case No. 24/08844
[19] For example: Douai Court of Appeal, 9 October 2025, Case No. 23/02718; Amiens Court of Appeal, 9 September 2025, Case No. 23/00031
[20] In particular: Paris Court of Appeal, 19 June 2025, Case No. 23/15092; Paris Court of Appeal, 15 May 2025, Case No. 24/02375; Versailles Court of Appeal, 29 April 2025, Case No. 24/04372; Rouen Court of Appeal, 10 April 2025, Case No. 24/01774; Paris Court of Appeal, 10 April 2025, Case No. 23/19207; Paris Court of Appeal, 3 April 2025, Case No. 23/19316; Riom Court of Appeal, 19 March 2025, Case No. 24/00497; Douai Court of Appeal, 27 February 2025, Case No. 23/00938
[21] Douai Court of Appeal, 9 October 2025, Case No. 23/02718
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